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II. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals, following an appeal from the Fourth District 
Court in and for Wasatch County. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
III. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES/STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Has Appellant met her burden of marshalling all evidence at trial tending to support the 
Court's findings and then demonstrating that despite such evidence the Court's findings are so 
lacking support as to be against the clear weight of evidence? Hagen v. Hagen. 810 P.2d 478 (Utah 
App. 1991) 
2. Has Appellant established the Court clearly and prejudicially abused its discretion in: 
(a) Imputing income to Mrs. Turner based on her 1995 earnings? 
(b) Calculating child support based on the Uniform Child Support Guidelines? 
(c) Not awarding alimony to Mrs. Turner based on the respective income and expenses of 
the parties and Mrs. Turner's interest in Duke Farms, Inc.? 
(d) Awarding each party a one-half interest in the martial home with Mrs. Turner given the 
option to buy out Mr. Turner's interest in the home immediately or sell the home and 
divide the equity when (a) the home is sold; (b) the youngest child reaches age 18 and 
graduates from high school, (c) Mrs. Turner remarries, co-habits with a male or dies; (d) 
Mrs. Turner ceases to use the home as her primary residence for more than three 
i v 
months; or (e) at any other time prior to the foregoing events in Mrs. Turner's sole 
discretion? 
(e) Dividing the USAA debt equally between the parties? 
(f) Awarding Mrs. Turner $1,650.00 attorney's fees? 
(Trial Court has considerable discretion in determining the financial interests of divorced 
parties and property and alimony awards will be upheld on appeal absent a showing of clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Bingham v. Bingham. 872 P.2d 1065,1067 (Utah App. 1994)). 
3. Mr. Turner requests his attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
IV. 
STATUTES 
Page 
Section 30-3-5(7)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 13 
Section 78-45-7.5(7)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 8,11 
Section 78-45-7.7(4), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 11 
Section 78-45-7.14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 11 
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V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
On or about October 18,1995, Melvon David Turner, (hereinafter "Mr. Turner") filed an 
action in the District Court of Wasatch County, Utah, seeking a divorce from Di Ann Carol Turner, 
(hereinafter "Mrs. Turner"). 
On November 21,1996, the case was tried without a jury before the Honorable Howard H. 
Maetani. Following the trial, the Court ordered that the parties' counsel submit proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as to the issues which were not settled prior to trial. 
On February 13,1997, Judge Maetani made and entered his Memorandum Decision setting 
forth his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (See Addendum A) 
On April 29,1997, the Court executed its Supplemental Memorandum Decision setting 
forth additional Findings of Fact. (See Addendum B) 
On June 13,1997, the Court executed the Supplemental Decree of Divorce after having 
resolved post-trial issues primarily relating to the language to be included in the Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce. (See Addendum C) 
On September 2,1997, the Court executed the Order on Objection to Supplemental Decree 
of Divorce, Motion to Correct Clerical Error and Rule 52 and 55 Motions. (See Addendum D) 
B. Statement of Relevant Facts 
1. Mr. Turner is a twenty-five year employee at the Utah Department of Employment 
Security earning $53,534.00 per year or $4,461.00 per month. Mr. Turner has no other income 
from any other source. (711 FOF; Tr. 12,26; Exhibit 1). 
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2. Mrs. Turner is employed at the Veteran's Hospital as a nurse. She has degrees in both 
education and nursing. Her income from nursing was $31,246.00 in 1994, $29,875.00 in 1995 and 
$19,783.50 through October 12,1996. (n 2 FOF; Tr. 78,110). 
3. Mrs. Turner has chosen not to work full time although full time employment is available 
at Veterans Hospital. Had she worked full time, Mrs. Turner could have made $33,693.00 at 
Veterans Hospital in 1996. (TT 2 FOF; Tr. 80,111). 
4. At the time of trial seven of the parties1 twelve children were residing in the family home 
and attending school. Their ages at the time of trial were 18, 16, 14, 11, 9, 8 and 5. The other five 
children are all adults and out of high school. (Tr. 113). 
5. In the early 1970's, Mrs. Turner's parents made a gift to the parties of approximately 1/3 
acre of ground located at 500 North 550 East, Heber City, Utah. In 1979, the parties built a home 
on said property, (n 5 FOF). 
6. The marital home had a fair market value of $199,500.00 as of the date of trial and a 
mortgage balance against the home of approximately $29,500.00 leaving an equity of $170,000.00. 
The monthly payment for the property is $499.20, which includes an escrow amount for taxes and 
insurance, (n 6 FOF; Tr. 81). 
7. In April, 1975, Mrs. Turner's parents incorporated Duke Farms, Inc. and gave each of 
their children a 1/5 interest in said corporation. At the time of incorporation, there were 22.28 acres 
and 17.5 shares of Wasatch Irrigation stock which comprised the assets of Duke Farms, Inc. (Tr. 18, 
19,21,50,84,88). 
8. When Duke Farms, Inc. was incorporated in 1975, the property was valued at $1,000 per 
acre. (Tr. 82). 
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9. The value of the Wasatch Irrigation stock at the time of trial is $5,000 per share or 
$87,500.00. (Tr. 88). 
10. The 22.28 acres originally comprising the Duke Farms, Inc. property has been reduced 
by the following: 
A. A gift of approximately 1/3 acre to David and Di Ann Turner for construction of their 
home; (Tr. 84). 
B. A gift of approximately 1/3 acre to John Duke for construction of his home; (Tr. 48, 84). 
C. A sale of approximately 4 acres to the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints; and 
(Tr. 48, 84). 
D. A deed of a small portion of property to Heber City Municipal Corporation for which 
Heber City has agreed to install a sidewalk and other improvements on the property at a later 
date. (Tr. 122). 
11. There is between 16.1 and 18.17 acres of property, which presently constitutes Duke 
Farms, Inc. (Tr. 48, 85). 
12. At the time of trial the property was appraised at $25,000.00 per acre or $454,250.00 
although Mrs. Turner indicated she would not sell the property for that amount. (Tr. 50, 85). 
13. During the course of the marriage, the parties have incurred the following indebtedness 
which remained unpaid at the time of trial: 
A. Mortgage indebtedness of $29,300.00; and, (Tr. 81). 
B. USAA loan for Christmas and other family expenses of $11,600.00. (n 24 FOF; 
Tr. 25). 
3 
14. Mr. Turner was transferred to St. George, Utah in connection with his employment and 
at the time of trial was living rent free in a fifth-wheel trailer pending purchase of a condominium. 
Mr. Turner qualified and intended to purchase in December, 1996, a condominium in St. George, 
Utah, for $85,000.00, which condominium will require a monthly payment of $797.00 and closing 
costs of $1,668.00. (Tr. 26, 27,28, 30). 
15. Mr. Turner's monthly expenses are as follows: 
House payment 
Food 
Child Support 
Telephone 
Laundry & cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical 
Dental 
Utilities 
Life insurance 
Accident insurance 
Bank card payment 
Gifts 
Hair 
Attorney's fees 
Car payment 
Federal tax 
State tax 
FICA 
FICAMD 
$ 797.00 
350.00 
1,453.00 
40.00 
40.00 
50.00 
10.00 
10.00 
100.00 
85.00 
15.00 
150.00 
150.00 
10.00 
100.00 
400.00 
394.00 
209.00 
284.00 
66.00 
TOTAL $4,713.00 (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4; Tr. 26-30). 
16. Mr. Turner's has a negative cash flow of $252.00 per month based on his $4,461.00 per 
month salary and $4,713.00 monthly expenses. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 4; Tr. 26-30). 
17. Mrs. Turner's monthly expenses are as follows: 
House payment $ 511.00 
Food 800.00 
Clothes 150.00 
Medical/dental 
Laundry 
Heat 
Electricity/gas 
Sewer, water, garbage 
Insurance 
Loan payments 
Recreation 
Car payment 
Drugs & cosmetics 
Gifts 
School & education 
Telephone 
Haircuts 
Attorney's fees 
Mandatory payroll deductions 
OASDI tax 
Medicare 
Federal tax 
State tax 
80.00 
10.00 
57.00 
60.00 
50.00 
105.00 
20.00 
100.00 
400.00 
30.00 
25.00 
30.00 
50.00 
50.00 
100.00 
67.00 
16.00 
75.00 
44.00 
TOTAL $2,830.00 (n 20 FOF; Tr. 94,95; Plaintiffs Exh. 10). 
18. Mrs. Turner has a positive monthly cash flow of $1,113.00 based on her monthly salary 
of $2,490.00 and child support of $1,453.00 (total monthly income of $3,943.00) and her monthly 
expenses of $2,830.00. (n 19, 20 FOF; Tr. 94, 95; Plaintiffs Exhibit 10). 
19. The parties separated in June, 1995 and had been living apart for approximately 18 
months at the time of trial. (Tr. 12). 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Imputing Income to Mrs. Turner at $2,490.00 per month is proper in light of her $2,604.00 
per month income in 1994, $2,490.00 per month income in 1995, $1,905.00 per month 
income in 1996 working part-time. Mrs. Turner's attempt to reduce her work hours prior to 
trial to 16 hours per week is unjustified inasmuch as full time work was readily available and 
5 
she worked 36 hours per week in 1995 and 32 hours per week in 1996 through September. 
Using the children to justify spending more time at home is not justified on the basis the 
parties had been separated for approximately 18 months at the time of trial and the minor 
children are capable of helping at home. Appellant failed to marshall the evidence 
supporting the Court's finding regarding the imputation of income issue. 
B. The Court's child support award is based on the Uniform Child Support Guidelines and a 
Child Support Obligation Worksheet admitted into evidence based on the respective incomes 
of the parties. Appellant has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the child support 
award and erroneously argued that the Child Support Worksheet was not filed in connection 
with the Supplemental Decree of Divorce. 
C. The trial Court properly denied alimony to Mrs. Turner based on her financial conditions and 
needs, her incapacity or ability to produce income, the ability of Mr. Turner to provide 
support and the length of the marriage. The Court's decision in this regard is supported by 
appropriate findings which establish that Mrs. Turner has a positive cash flow of $1,112.00 
per month and Mr. Turner has a negative cash flow of $252.00 per month. The Court's 
decision not to award alimony is also based on Mrs. Turner's 20% interest in Duke Farms, 
Inc. which has assets valued at $541,750.00. Mr. Turner was not awarded any interest in 
Duke Farms, Inc. in the divorce action. Mrs. Turner failed to marshall the evidence relating 
to the parties' income and expenses and the value of Duke Farms, Inc. in addressing the 
alimony issue. 
D. The Court properly awarded Mr. Turner his one-half interest in the family home. Allowing 
Mrs. Turner the option of buying out Mr. Turner's interest in the home immediately or 
6 
selling the home and dividing the equity at a later date is fair and equitable. If Mrs. Turner 
did not want Mr. Turner to benefit in the appreciation of the property or mortgage pay-down 
she has the ability to refinance the marital home based on her considerable equity in the 
marital home and her financial circumstances. 
E. The Court's decision to equally divide the $11,600.00 USAA marital debt is clearly within 
the Court's discretion. Mrs. Turner is in a much better position to pay the debt based on her 
monthly cash flow. 
F. The Court's awarding Mrs. Turner $1,650.00 for attorney's fees is based on a consideration 
of the pertinent factors in making an attorney fees award and is further based on the Court's 
making the requisite findings relating to the time expended, reasonableness of rates charged, 
legal rates in the community for the type of work involved, the financial needs of the parties, 
the issues raised in litigation and the $350.00 offset necessitated by Plaintiffs Motion to 
Compel. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
A. MRS. TURNER HAS FAILED TO SATISFACTORILY 
MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT COMMITTED CLEAR ERROR ON THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING SHOULD BE LEFT 
UNDISTURBED. 
The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the financial 
interests of divorced parties and property and alimony awards will be upheld on 
appeal unless a clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Bingham 
v. Bingham, supra. Further, the appealing party has the burden to marshall all 
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evidence introduced at trial tending to support the court's finding and then 
demonstrate that despite such evidence the Court's finding is so lacking support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence. In Hagen v. Hagen. supra., the Court 
in addressing the standard of review on appeal stated: 
We will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact in a divorce proceeding 
unless such findings are clearly erroneous. Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 
1251 (Utah CtApp. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
On appeal, it is the burden of the party seeking to overturn the trial court's 
decision to "marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so 
lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus 
making them 'clearly erroneous.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 
(Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)); see 
also Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465,468 (Utah Ct.App. 1989). 810 P.2d at 
481 
Mrs. Turner has failed to marshall the evidence in support of the Court's 
decision on virtually all issues raised on appeal. Such failure will be addressed 
separately in the following arguments. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
IMPUTING INCOME TO MRS. TURNER. 
Utah laws requires that prior to imputing income to a party in a divorce 
action the Court must first find that the party is voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed. Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.5(7)(a), which has been 
applied in both child support and alimony cases, codifies this requirement and 
provides: 
Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the 
amount imputed or a hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed. 
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Contrary to Mrs. Turner's assertion, the trial court made a finding that Mrs. 
Turner was voluntarily underemployed and even referred to the above quoted 
section: 
The Court finds that Defendant is employable, and able to work at a level 
above which she is currently employed. The Court will therefore, impute 
income to Defendant based on her historical earnings for 1995, or $2,490.00 
per month. This is done in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 5 78-45-7.5(7) 
(1996). (FOF 15 - Addendum A) 
The question of what constitutes voluntary underemployment has been the 
subject of considerable activity in the appellate courts in recent years. In Hall v. 
HalL 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993), the Utah Court of Appeals explained that a 
finding of voluntary underemployment must be based on a thorough appraisal of a 
variety of factors, including the parties' abilities, employment capacity, earnings 
potential and possible job openings available. In this case, the trial court considered 
and weighed the above factors and determined that Mrs. Turner was voluntarily 
underemployed. In this regard, FOF 2 (Addendum A) provides: 
2. Defendant has degrees in both education and nursing, but has chosen not 
to work full time outside the home. Her income from nursing was 
$29,875.00 in 1995, and $19,783.50 through October 12,1996. 
The testimony is undisputed that Mrs. Turner's income in 1994 was 
$31,246.00 or $2,604.00 per month; her income in 1995 working a 36 hour week 
was $29,875.00 or $2,490.00 per month; her income through October 12,1996 
working part-time was $19,783.50 or $1,905.00 per month. Further, had she worked 
full time in 1996 her income would have been $33,693.00 or $2,808.00 per month 
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and she just received a raise prior to trial. Mrs. Turner testified she could have 
worked full time if she so desired. (Tr. 78-80,110-112). Mrs. Turner failed to 
marshall this evidence in her brief. 
Notwithstanding the income levels as set forth above, Mrs. Turner testified at 
trial her income was $1,123.00 per month. To explain the discrepancy between her 
yearly earnings in 1996 and her income calculation of $1,123.00 per month, Mrs. 
Turner admitted that she cut her work hours to 16 hours per week less than two 
months before trial. (Tr. 110). 
Mrs. Turner justifies her use of the reduced monthly income by alleging that 
there are seven children in the home to support and one of the teenage children 
threatened suicide since the separation of the parties. The children of the parties are 
all of school age. Jonathan was 18 at the date of trial and was scheduled to graduate 
from high school at the conclusion of the then current school year. Katie was 16; 
Robert was 14, Elizabeth was one month short of 12; Benjamin was 9; Gabriel was 
8; and Nathan was one month short of 6. These children are old enough to help in 
the home and Mrs. Turner can work more than 2 shifts per week. (Tr. 113; R. 8, 9) 
The threat of suicide is a serious allegation, but does not justify working two 
shifts or 16 hours per week. The suicide threat occurred approximately one year 
prior to trial and shortly after the separation of the parties in June, 1995. There was 
no testimony that the threat of suicide existed at the time of trial. If anything, Mrs. 
Turner should be able to work more not less hours as the children grow older and the 
children become accustomed to having their father not reside at home. 
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The record is clear that the trial court made the requisite finding under 
U.C.A. 78-45-7.5(7)(a) that Mrs. Turner was voluntarily underemployed and there is 
sufficient evidence presented at trial to support the Court's imputing income to Mrs. 
Turner at her 1995 level. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
COMPUTING THE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD. 
Defendant challenges the child support award on the basis that no Child 
Support Worksheet was filed and the Court made inadequate findings. Such 
arguments are false. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit Six is a Child Support Obligation Worksheet which was 
admitted as evidence in this case (Tr. 28, Addendum E). This Worksheet uses Mrs. 
Turner's income of $2,490.00 per month and Mr. Turner's income of $4,461.00 per 
month as found by the Court. (FOF 1 and 15 - Addendum A). Again, Mrs. Turner 
has failed to marshall this evidence in her brief. 
The Child Support Worksheet indicates that Mr. Turner's child support 
obligation is $1,452.80 per month which is the amount ordered by the Court in FOF 
16 (Addendum A) which provides: 
16. Based on the incomes of the parties, child support will be set at 
$1,452.80 per month. 
The combined child support obligation table (Section 78-45-7.14) provides 
combined child support obligations for up to six children. U.C.A. Section 78-45-
7.7(4) provides: 
For more than six children, additional amounts may be added to the base 
child support obligation shown. Unless rebutted by Subsection 78-45-7.2(3), 
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the amount ordered shall not be less than the amount which would be 
ordered for up to six children. 
Mr. Turner explained how he calculated child support for seven children 
when the Child Support Obligation table only goes up to six. Mr. Turner testified: 
Q. And why have you calculated seven if you have six children under 
eighteen? 
A. I have a son that just turned eighteen, he will graduate from high school 
in May and I feel like I need to take care of him through his graduation. 
Q. The table for determining the amount of child support goes up to six 
children, how did you calculate for seven? 
A. I took the difference between five and six and added that same amount to 
make up for the next column. (Tr. 29) 
Mr. Turner's approach which was accepted by the Court is rational and in 
accordance with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines. Further, Mr. Turner is not 
financially capable of providing additional child support and Mrs. Turner has more 
than enough revenues each month to meet her monthly expenditures. (See 
Argument D below). 
D. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
ALIMONY TO MRS. TURNER. 
In Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
well-settled standard for alimony in Utah. The Court stated: 
The most important function of alimony is to provide support for the [spouse] as 
nearly as possible at the standard of living she [or he] enjoyed during the marriage, 
and to prevent the [spouse] from becoming a public charge. English v. English, 565 
P.2d [409] at 411 (Utah 1977)... Three factors... must be considered in fixing a 
reasonable alimony award: 
[1] the financial conditions and needs of the [spouse seeking 
support]; 
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[2] the ability of the [spouse seeking support] to produce a sufficient 
income for [himself or] herself; and 
[3] the ability of the [payor spouse] to provide support. 
Courts have reiterated this legal standard on a regular basis in addressing alimony issues. 
Bell v. Bell. 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991), Thronson vT ThTOMPB, 810 P.2d 428, 435 (Utah App. 
1991), Willev v. Willev. 333 Utah Adv. Rpt. 8 (Utah 9197), Hill v. Hill. 869 P.2d 963 (Utah App. 
1993) and Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. 240 Utah Adv. Rep. 11,12 (1994). 
The 1995 Legislature codified the factors to consider in making an alimony determination. 
Section 30-3-5(7)(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, now provides: 
The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipients1 earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
The Court referenced the foregoing statute and set forth the above four 
factors in FOF 17 (Addendum A). The Court further cited Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 
96 (Utah 1986) wherein the Utah Supreme Court determined that "the purpose of 
alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and prevent that spouse from 
becoming a public charge". Mrs. Turner's argument as it relates to the alimony 
issue is that the Court failed to make appropriate findings. However, the Court's 
Memorandum Decision clearly establishes that the appropriate findings were made. 
With respect to the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, the Court 
made the following findings: 
19. When imputing income to Defendant at her 1995 level, Defendant has a 
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gross monthly income for herself and the children, after receiving child 
support, of $3,942.80. Gross income was compared in this case since 
the Court did not have tax figures for Defendant. 
20. Defendant has listed her monthly expenses as $2,830.00. 
21. The Court will decline to award alimony in this case. Considering the 
respective incomes of the parties, and the ability of Defendant to 
produce income, alimony is not needed to allow her to maintain the 
standard of living she enjoyed while married, or to keep her from 
becoming a public charge. (Addendum A) 
Based on the foregoing findings, Mrs. Turner has a positive monthly cash 
flow of $1,112.00 per month. Further, had the Court not imputed income to Mrs. 
Turner but used her monthly income in 1996 she still would have a positive monthly 
cash flow of $527.44. 
$1,904.64 1996 Monthly income 
+$1.452.80 Child Support 
$3,357.44 Subtotal 
-$2.83Q,QQ Expenses 
$ 527.44 POSITIVE MONTHLY CASH FLOW 
The second factor is Mrs. Turner's earning capacity or ability to produce 
income. As set forth above, the Court made findings that Defendant has degrees in 
both education and nursing, her income from nursing was $29,875.00 in 1995 and 
$19,783.50 through October 12,1996. (FOF 2 - Addendum A). The Court also 
found that Defendant is employable and able to work at a level above which she is 
currently employed and imputed income at her historical earnings for 1995 of 
$2,490.00 per month. (FOF 15 - Addendum A). 
The third factor considered by the Court is the ability of Mr. Turner to 
provide support. In this regard, the Court found that Mr. Turner earned $4,461.00 
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per month and has a gross monthly income after paying child support of $3,008.20. 
(FOF 1,18- Addendum A) Further, Plaintiffs Exhibit 4 was received by the Court 
which sets forth Mr. Turner's monthly income and expense and shows a negative 
cash flow of $252.00 per month. 
The last factor considered by the Court is the length of marriage. The parties 
were married on March 18,1966. The Court obviously considered this factor in not 
awarding alimony as it set forth this factor as a consideration. Long term marriages 
do not mean alimony should be paid when the other factors dictate otherwise. It 
only means that if alimony is justified, it should continue for a longer period. 
It is well established in Utah that alimony awards should to the extent 
possible equalize the parties' respective standards of living and maintain them at a 
level as close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. 
Howell v, HowdL 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App 1991); Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 
1076, 1081 (Utah 1988); Jones v. Jones, sma; Higlev v. Higlev. 676 P2d 379, 381 
(Utah 1983). In Howell, supra. Judge Bench in his concurring opinion indicated that 
the alimony award should not reduce the standard of living of the paying spouse 
below that of the receiving spouse: 
The alimony award, however, need not be large enough to maintain the receiving 
spouse at the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage if that amount of 
alimony would lower the standard of living of the paying spouse below that of the 
receiving spouse. Alimonv mav onlv raise the standard of living of the receiving 
spouse until it is roughly equal to that of the paying spouse. It is in this sense that 
alimony should seek "to the extent possible, [to] equalize the parties1 respective post-
divorce living standards." Rasband v. Rasband. 752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988) (Emphasis added) 806 P.2d at 1216. 
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The Court specifically found that "alimony is not needed to allow her [Mrs. 
Turner] to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed while married". Mr. Turner's 
standard of living is already below the standard of living of Mrs. Turner and alimony 
is certainly not justified. 
Even if the trial court had not made the appropriate findings, the alimony 
award should not be reversed or remanded. In Schaumberg v. Schaumberg. supra.. 
the husband claimed the trial court abused its discretion in awarding his wife 
$800.00 per month alimony because it failed to make findings regarding the wife's 
need. Addressing this issue the Court of Appeals stated: 
When the trial court has failed to make findings on the three factors listed 
above, we reverse, unless pertinent facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018,1025 (Utah App. 1993); Howell, 
806 P.2d at 1213. So long as the record is clear that the trial court has 
considered these three factors, we will not disturb its determination regarding 
alimony unless it has clearly abused its discretion. 875 P.2d at 602 
The record is abundantly clear that the Court considered the appropriate 
factors in denying alimony. 
The Court also considered Mrs. Turner's interest in Duke Farms, Inc. in 
denying an alimony award.. The Court made the following finding: 
22. The Court has also taken into account Defendant's interest in Duke 
Farms, Inc., in deciding not to award alimony. The court in Mortensen, 
supra, stated: "The fact that one spouse has inherited or donated 
property, particularly if it is income producing, may properly be 
considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by that 
spouse..." at 308. (Addendum A) 
The case of Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (1988) is the landmark 
case in Utah as it relates to how a court should allocate inherited or gifted property in 
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a divorce proceeding. The Court rejected Mr. Turner's claim that he should have 
received part of his wife's interest in Duke Farms, Inc. based on his efforts in 
watering and putting up hay on the property. However, the Court appropriately 
considered Mrs. Turner's interest in the property as a factor in deciding whether 
alimony is needed. As set forth above, Defendant has a 20% interest in Duke Farms, 
Inc. or 20% of an asset valued at $454,250.00 plus water stock of $87,500.00. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Turner's interest in Duke Farms, Inc. is $108,350.00. This is 
based on a per acre price of $25,000.00 and Mrs. Turner adamantly testified she 
would not sell the property for that price. (Tr. 85). 
Mrs. Turner failed to marshall the evidence relating to the parties incomes 
and expenses and the value of Duke Farms, Inc. in addressing the alimony issue. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF MR. TURNER'S 
INTEREST IN THE MARTIAL HOME WAS PROPER. 
The trial court determined that the martial home was valued $199,500.00 and 
had a mortgage at the time of trial of $29,500.00. (FOF 6 - Addendum A). The 
Court determined that the equity in the martial residence, both land and 
improvements, should be divided evenly between the parties. (FOF 7 - Addendum 
A). The Court awarded Mrs. Turner possession of the marital residence, including 
all debt thereon, until such time as the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18, 
or graduates from high school, whichever occurs later, or until Mrs. Turner 
remarries, cohabitates with a member of the opposite sex, or dies. (FOF 9 -
Addendum A). Mrs. Turner objected to the Court's original Supplemental Decree of 
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Divorce resulting in a Supplemental Memorandum Decision wherein the Court 
made the following additional findings relating to the marital home: 
1. Defendant has objected to Plaintiffs proposed division of the parties' 
marital home. Specifically, Defendant objects that if the home is sold at 
a future date, and the equity divided at that time, then Plaintiff will 
benefit from Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage. Conversely, it 
could potentially be another 12 years before the marital home is sold. It 
would be patently unfair to tie up Plaintiffs equity for that time without 
providing some sort of compensation. Further, Defendant has the 
benefit of the use of the home until it is sold. 
2. This Court, therefore, will order that the martial home be sold upon the 
happening of one of the events outlined in the Memorandum Decision, 
and equity in the home divided at that time, with each party receiving 
half. If Defendant wishes to prevent Plaintiff from benefiting from 
Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage, Defendant can choose to buy 
out Plaintiffs interest in the home; however, the Defendant will have 
one year from the date of the signing of the Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce in which to decide whether or not she wants to buy out Plaintiff, 
and make a substantial effort to do so. In either case, the value of 
Plaintiffs interest in the home will be determined by taking one-half the 
equity in the home at the time Plaintiff is paid out, and not the equity that 
existed on the date of trial. (Addendum B). 
Mrs. Turner now argues that it is unfair and inequitable for Turner to benefit 
from her pay-down of the mortgage or the appreciation of the home pending 
occurrence of one of the triggering events described in the Supplemental Divorce 
Decree. She further argues that she is prevented from financing her home to pay Mr. 
Turner's equity based on the Court's failing to award her alimony or additional child 
support. 
At the time of trial there was an equity in the marital home of $170,000.00 of 
which Mr. Turner's share is $85,000.00. The Court gave Mrs. Turner the option of 
paying off Mr. Turner's equity or waiting until the home is sold. Further, the Court 
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gave the parties the option of offsetting their interest in the other parties' retirement 
against the equity in the home. 
The parties, at their option, may offset their respective interests in the other's 
retirement against the equity in the home, or make other arrangements as 
they desire in order to avoid the additional paperwork of obtaining a 
qualified domestic relations order. (FOF 14 - Addendum A). 
If Mrs. Turner wanted to reap the benefits of her mortgage pay-down and 
any appreciation on the property, she could have refinanced the home and paid off 
Mr. Turner his $64,416.00 equity after offsetting the retirement plans. Her total 
indebtedness would have been $93,916.00 on a home appraised at $199,500.00 and 
her principal and interest payment on a 30 year loan would have been less than 
$700.00 per month on an eight percent loan. (See Amortization Table-Addendum F) 
This would have resulted in an increased mortgage payment of less than $200.00 per 
month which Mrs. Turner could easily afford based on her income and expenses as 
set forth above. Again, Mrs. Turner failed to marshall the evidence regarding the 
home value, indebtedness and right to offset retirement values. 
F. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY DIVIDED THE 
USAA DEBT EQUALLY BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The Court made the following finding with respect to the USAA debt: 
23. The USAA loan in the amount of $11,600.00 is marital debt. As such, it 
should be divided with each party being responsible for paying 
$5,800.00 towards the debt. (Addendum A). 
In Boyle v. Boyle. 735 P.2d 669 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) the Court stated: 
This Court will refrain from disturbing findings of the trial court in a divorce 
action unless a clear abuse of discretion is shown. Searle v. Searle, 522 
P.2d 697 (Utah 1974). The trial court is clearly in the best position to weigh 
the evidence, determine credibility and arrive at factual conclusions. In this 
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case the trial judge considered all evidence presented as to the marital assets 
and debts as they existed prior to and during the marriage, and subsequent to 
the separation of the parties. It would be inappropriate for this Court to 
reverse on an isolated item of property or debt distribution. Rather, this 
Court must examine the entire distribution to determine if the trial court 
abused its discretion. 735 P.2d at 670 
Mrs. Turner argues that the Court should require Mr. Turner to pay the 
US AA debt in its entirety but fails to indicate the debt was incurred for marital 
purposes and she is in a better position to pay the debt based on her monthly cash 
flow. 
G. THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD WAS PROPERLY MADE. 
It is well established that the decision to award attorney's fees, and the amount of such fees 
is within the trial court's discretion. Rappleye v. Rappleye. 855 P.2d 260,265 (Utah App. 1993). 
Further, a party seeking attorney's fees in a divorce action must present evidence which establishes 
the financial need of the requesting party and demonstrates the reasonableness of the amount of the 
award. Munns v. Munns. 790 P.2d 116,122 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Judge Maetani entered the 
following findings as it relates to the issue of attomey's fees and costs: 
26. In determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees the Court considers 
the following factors specified in Beals v. Beals, 682 P.2d 862 (Utah 1984); cited in 
Huckv.Huck. 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986), and in Talley v. Talley. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah 
App. 1987): 
a. Necessity of the number or hours dedicated by the attorney; 
b. reasonableness of the rate charged; 
c. rates commonly charged for divorce actions in the community; and, 
d. financial need of the requesting party. 
27. Defendant is requesting attorney's fees in the amount of $4,096.00. Plaintiff has 
requested that each party pay their own attorney fees, but that Plaintiff be awarded 
$350.00 in connection to a Motion to Compel. 
28. The Court finds that each attorney in this case has expended a reasonable amount of 
time, and has charged a rate that is in accordance with the going rates in the community 
for this type of work. 
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29. The Plaintiff in this action has caused some increase in attorney's fees by 
pressing an unreasonable claim for the assets of Duke Farms, Inc. The Coiirt 
will award Defendant $2,000 in attorney's fees and costs, and offset that amount 
by the $350 necessitated by Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. The total award of 
attorney's fees to be paid to Defendant by Plaintiff is therefore $1,650.00. 
(Addendum A). 
The trial court is much better suited to determine reasonable attorney's fees than an 
appellate court. Willey v. Willey. supra. Accordingly, the trial court's decision in awarding 
attorney's fees should be affirmed and Mr. Turner should be awarded his attorney's fees and 
costs on appeal. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Turner has failed to meet her burden, as one challenging findings of fact, to 
marshall all evidence introduced at trial that supports the Court's findings and then 
demonstrate that regardless of that support of evidence, the trial court's factual 
determination is against the clear weight of the evidence. Absent such a complete 
presentation of these supported evidence, the appellate court is bound to accept the trial 
court's findings which clearly establish: 
(1) Mrs. Turner's income was properly imputed at $2,490.00 per month based on 
her historical earnings for 1995; 
(2) The child support award was computed properly in accordance with the 
Uniform Child Support Guidelines and supported by a properly prepared Child 
Support Obligation Worksheet; 
(3) The trial court properly denied alimony to Mrs. Turner based on her financial 
condition and needs, her earning capacity or ability to produce income and the 
ability of Mr. Turner to provide support; 
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(4) The trial court properly determined Mr. Turner's interest in the martial home inasmuch 
as Mrs. Turner was given the option to pay Mr. Turner his equity immediately or 
postpone payment until one of the triggering events provided for in the Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce; and 
(5) The division of the USAA debt and attorney's fees award was properly made. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of March, 1998. 
Terry L. Christiansen 
ADKINS & CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee, were 
mailed, postage prepaid, to Steven Kuhnhausen, Joseph F. Orifici, Attorney for 
Defendant/Appellant, 450 South 900 East, Suite 240, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, on this day 
of March, 1998. 
Terry L.Christiansen 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASATCH, STATE OF UTAH 
MELVON DAVID TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DI ANN CAROL TURNER, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 954400098 
Judge Howard H. Maetani 
This matter came before the Court for trial on November 21, 1996, before the 
Honorable Howard H. Maetani, District Court Judge. Plaintiff Melvon David Turner was 
present and represented by counsel Terry L. Christiansen. Defendant Di Ann Carol Turner 
was present and represented by counsel Mary C. Corporon. The Court heard argument, and 
granted parties 10 days to submit their proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Said documents were received by the Court from both Plaintiff and Defendant on or about 
December 20, 1996. Plaintiff submitted Objections to the proposed Findings on or about 
December 26, 1996. Defendant submitted Objections to the proposed Findings on or about 
January 6, 1997. The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, considered the exhibits 
and arguments of counsel, reviewed the submitted documents, and being fully advised in the 
premises now makes the following: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
A. Findings of Fact 
1. Plaintiff is employed at the Utah Department of Employment Security at the 
rate of $53,534.00 per year, or $4,461.00 per month. 
2. Defendant has degrees in both education and nursing, but has chosen not to 
work full time outside the home. Her income from nursing was $29,875.00 in 1995, and 
$19/78") 50 through Oiiribei 12, J0%» 
Duke Family Farm 
3. 1 he Defendant has acquired an interest in Duke Farms, Inc. Ilie Coui t finds 
that this property was given to Defendant as a gift from her family. The court in Bingham v. 
Bingham, 872 P.2d 1065 (Utah App. 1994), stated: 
trial courts should generally award property acquired by one spouse by gift and 
inheritance during the marriage (or property acquired in exchange thereof) to 
that spouse, together with any appreciation or enhancement of its value, unless 
(1) the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense contributed to the 
enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an 
equitable interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its identity 
lost through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse has 
made a gift of an interest therein to the other spouse. 
at 1068-1069 (quoting Monensi m \ Mi memi m., 760 P.2d 304 308 ( ( Jtah 1988). 
4. The Court finds that Plaintiff has performed some work on Duke Farms, Inc. 
The work done by Plaintiff, however, did nothing to enhance, maintain, or protect the present 
value of the land. Furthermore, the property has not been consumed, commingled, or given 
as a gift to Plaintiff. Under the Mortensen test, Plaintiff fails to establish an interest in Duke 
Farms, and any interest therein acquired by the Defendant during the marriage is the sole 
property of Defendant. 
Marital Home 
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5. In the early 1970's, Defendant's parents made a gift to the parties of 
approximately 1/3 acre of ground located at 500 North 550 East, Heber City, Utah. In 1979, 
the parties built a home on said property. 
6. The value of the entire marital residence, land and improvements included, is 
$199,500.00. The land on which the residence sits is alone valued at $42,000.00. There is a 
current mortgage against the home of approximately $29,500.00. 
7. The Court finds that the equity in the marital residence, both land and 
improvements, is to be divided evenly between the parties. 
8. The Court finds the land upon which the residence sits to be a gift to the 
marriage, intended for the use and enjoyment of both parties. The parties were married a 
substantial length of time before they received the land, and there is no evidence at trial that 
the land was intended to be a gift solely to Defendant. Also, Plaintiff has expended a 
substantial amount of time and effort maintaining, enhancing, and protecting the value of the 
property, therefore meeting the standard set forth in Moriensen, supra. Furthermore, as stated 
by the court in Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987), a trial court has "broad discretion . 
. . in the division of property, regardless of its source or time of acquisition." at 134-135. 
9. Defendant is awarded possession of the marital residence, including all debt 
thereon, until such time as the parties' youngest child reaches the age of 18, or graduates from 
high school, whichever occurs later, or until Defendant remarries, cohabitates with a member 
of the opposite sex, or dies. 
Automobiles 
y/ 10. Each party is awarded the automobile that is currently in their possession, 
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including all deb! atul equity associated therewith. 
ty7 Retirement Benefits 
11. Plauiliff has ,i ifliitMiicii! pi an |HII?»IJIIIII to Ins employment wild a t ;isli value of 
$50,300.00 as of September 30, 1996. 
12. Defendant has a retirement plan with a cash value of $9,133.00 
13. The retirement plans are marital property, and should be divided, with each 
party taking a one-half interest in the retirement plan of the other. 
14. The parties, at their option, may offset their respective interests in the other's 
retirement against the equity in the home, or make other arrangements as they desire in order 
to avoid the nklifioiial papei voui ol obtaining a qualified (lonnm 1m n Lillians aider. 
Child Support 
15. 1 he Coiii t: f inds that Defendant is employable, and able to >A orl : at a level 
above which she is currently employed. The Court will therefore, impute income to 
Defendant based on her historical earnings for 1995, or $2,490.00 per month. This is done in 
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.5(7) (1996). 
/ 16. Based on the incomes of the parties, child support will be set at $1452.80 per 
month. 
Alimony 
17. Ulah I ode An i <"? tO-J.'i |)M'M"»| stair, HI iintm ml pail lli.il flu1" < uuil must 
consider the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient spouse's earning capacity or ability to produce income, 
I 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
See U.C.A. § 30-3-5(7)(a) (Supp. 1995). 
In Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 96 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court determined that 
the purpose of alimony is to enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and prevent that spouse from becoming a 
public charge. 
18. In the present case, Plaintiff has a gross monthly income, after paying child 
support, of $3,008.20. 
19. When imputing income to Defendant at her 1995 level, Defendant has a gross 
monthly income for herself and the children, after receiving child support, of $3,942.80. 
Gross income was compared in this case since the Court did not have tax figures for 
Defendant. 
20. Defendant has listed her monthly expenses as $2,830.00. 
21. The Court will decline to award alimony in this case Considering the 
respective incomes of the parties, and the ability of Defendant to produce income, alimony is 
not needed to allow her to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed while married, or to 
keep her from becoming a public charge. 
22. The Court has also taken into account Defendant's interest in Duke Farms, Inc., 
in deciding not to award alimony. The court in Mortensen, supm, stated: "The fact that one 
spouse has inherited or donated property, particularly if it is income producing, may properly 
be considered as eliminating or reducing the need for alimony by that spouse . . ." at 308. 
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1) S A A and Appraisal Debt 
t// 23. The appraisal cost incurred by Plaintiff for the marital home is $300. The 
parlies should split the covl n4 (lie appimsui <Mlli caili p,iyiii|> 1>lir*0. 
24. The USAA loan in the amount of $11,600.00 is marital debt. As such, it 
should be divided with each party being responsible for paying $5,800.00 towai ds the debt. 
25. Each party will maintain possession of their own bank accounts, and all monies 
therein. 
/ Attorney's Fees and Costs 
26. In determining the appropriateness of an award of attorney's fees the Court 
* uiLsi*,l*li«» tin' lallnu'ini; factois specified ID Beals v. Seals. 68 ! P }d 862 (Utah 10K4 I, cited in 
Huck v. Huck. 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986), and in Tallev v. Tallev. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 
198 7): 
a. necessity of the number or hours dedicated by the attorney; 
b. reasonableness of the rate charged; 
c. rates con imonly chai ged for divorce actions in the community, and 
d. financial need of the requesting party. 
27. Defei idant is i equesting attorney's fees in flic ainnunl ol \\ 096 00 Phiiiliff 
has requested that each party pay their own attorney fees, but that Plaintiff be awarded $350 
in connection to a Motion to Compel. 
28. The Court finds that each attorney in this case has expended a reasonable 
amount of time, and has charged a rate that is in accordance with the going rates in the 
cnrimiumlv loi this typt* *d" ' vork. 
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29. The Plaintiff in this action has caused some increase in attorney's fees by 
pressing an unreasonable claim for the assets of Duke Farms, Inc. The Court will award 
Defendant $2,000 in attorney's fees and costs, and offset that amount by the $350 necessitated 
by Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. The total award of attorney's fees to be paid to Defendant 
by Plaintiff is therefore $1,650.00. 
Conclusions of Law 
' 1. Plaintiff shall take no interest in the property known as Duke Farms, Inc. 
The marital residence, both land and improvements, are property of the 
marriage, and the equity therein shall be evenly divided. 
Each party is awarded the automobile currently in their possession, including 
all equity. 
( / 4. Each party will take a one-half interest in the retirement plan amounts of the 
other party. 
*5. Child support is set at $1,452.80 paid to Defendant by Plaintiff each month. 
>/ 6. No alimony shall be awarded in this case. 
\/l. The Debt known as the U.S.A.A. loan shall be evenly divided, with each party 
owing one half the debt. 
v / 8 . Each party will pay one half the cost for the appraisal of the marital home. 
* / 9 . Each party will maintain possession of their respective bank accounts, and all 
monies therein. 
10. Defendant is awarded attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $1,650.00. 
11. All other issues now before the Court have been resolved pursuant to the above 
7 
Findings of Fact which are, by this reference, fully incorporated herein as the Court's 
Conclusions of Law 
12. The Decree of Divorce should be modified in conformity with the foregoing. 
13. Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare an Order consistent with the foregoing, and 
siibniii 1 Mi lIn1 fVniff (fur signature 
Dated this day of February, 1997. 
BY m i . COURT: 
—HOWARD H. MAETANI 
District Court Judge 
Mary C. Corporon 
Terry L. Christiansen 
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F I L E D 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
A D D E N D U M 6 Utah County, State of Utah. 
CARMAB. SMITH, Clerk 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASATCH, STATE OF UTAH 
MEL VON DAVID TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DI ANN CAROL TURNER, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 954400098 
Judge Howard H. Maetani 
This matter came before the Court for trial on November 21, 1996, before the 
Honorable Howard H. Maetani, District Court Judge. Plaintiff Melvon David Turner was 
present and represented by counsel Terry L. Christiansen. Defendant Di Ann Carol Turner 
was present and represented by counsel Mary C. Corporon. The Court heard argument, and 
granted parties 10 days to submit their proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Said documents were received by the Court from both Plaintiff and Defendant on or about 
December 20, 1996. Plaintiff submitted Objections to the proposed Findings on or about 
December 26, 1996. Defendant submitted Objections to the proposed Findings on or about 
January 6, 1997. The Court issued a Memorandum Decision on February 13, 1997, 
instructing counsel for Plaintiff to prepare a Supplemental Decree of Divorce, and submit it to 
the Court for signature. The Court received the Supplemental Decree from Plaintiff on or 
about April 14, 1997. Defendant submitted an Objection to the Supplemental Decree on or 
about April 18, and Plaintiff submitted a Response to Objection on April 23. The Court, 
* "g 
fully advised in the premises now makes the following: 
SUIMMOMENTAL MEMORANDUM DECISION 
A. Findings of Fact 
1. Defendant has objected to Plaintiffs proposed division of the parties marital 
home. Specifically, Defendant objects that if the home is sold at a future date, and the equity 
divided at that time, then Plaintiff will benefit from Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage. 
Conversely, il eoult! pnlciifinlly he another 1? y< Jir: hH'nn1 lln' marilal home is .sold fl would 
be patently unfair to tie up Plaintiffs equity for that time without providing some sort of 
compensation : 
2. This Court, therefore, will order that the marital home be sold upon the 
happening of one of the events outlined in the Memorandum Decision, and equity in the 
home divided at that time, with each party receiving half. If Defendant wishes to prevent 
Plaintiff from benefiting from Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage, Defendant can choose 
the date of the signing of the Supplemental Decree of Divorce in which to decide whether or 
not she wants to buy out Plaintiff, ami make .i substantial cfToi! lo do so 111] .'illit'i utse, lite 
value of Plaintiffs interest in the home will be determined by taking one-half the equity in the 
home at the time Plaintiff is paid out, and not the equity that existed on the date of trial. 
3. Defendant objected to Plaintiffs disposition of the retirement accounts. It is 
this Court's order that the retirement accounts be divided based on their value at the time of 
trial HIP parties should cxdiarwe this information wifiiiii Ml \\\\ IK lln1 parties cannot 
2 
agree on the mechanics of the division, then each party will prepare, at their own expense, a 
qualified domestic relations order to obtain their interest in the other's retirement account 
4. Also absent from Plaintiffs Supplemental Decree of Divorce was the Court's 
ruling on attorney's fees. The Court awarded attorney's fees and costs to Defendant in the 
amount of $1,650.00. 
5. The foregoing Supplemental Memorandum Decision should be incorporated 
into this Court's prior Memorandum Decision. In all other respects, Plaintiffs Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce is in accordance with this Court's intentions. 
6. Counsel for Plaintiff is to prepare another Supplemental Decree of Divorce in 
accordance with the above, and submit it to the Court for signature. 
Dated this A f day of April, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
^fouu2jjic 
HOWARD Hr-MAETANI 
District Court Judge 
cc: 
Mary C. Corporon 
Terry L. Christiansen 
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ADDENDUM C 
Terry L. Christiansen (#0654) 
ADKINS & CHRISTIANSEN, P.C. 
P.O. Box 680284 
Park City, Utah 84068 
Telephone: (801) 649-9061 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIA1 » DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELVON DAVID TURNER, ) SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, ) 
j s • ) 
Dl ANN CAROL TURNER, ) Case No. 954400098DA 
Defendant. ) Judge: Howard H. Maetani 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE THE COURT for trial on 
November 21, 1:996, before the Honorable Howar c:i 1 1 Maetani, District 
Court Judge, Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through his 
counsel of record, Terry L. Christiansen and defendant appeared in 
person and by and through her counsel of record, Mary C. Corporon. 
The court having heard the testimony of witnesses, reviewed the 
exhibits and considered the arguments and proposed Findings of Fact: 
and Conclusions of Law and objections thereto filed by both 
counsel, and having resolved the issues remaining after trial 
pursuant to its Memorandum Decisi on dated I lary 1 3 , ] 99 7. whi eh 
set forth the Courtr s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
the issues in dispute, and further having resolved the objection to 
the Supplemental Decree ol Mivorce purssudiif 1 '" ii t:« .'.iupplemental 
Memorandum Decision dated April 29, 1997, based thereon and for 
good cause appearing; 
^ .Deputy 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The Decree of Divorce heretofore executed on December 18, 
1996, is modified herein. 
2. Plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce from the 
defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable differences, the same 
to become final and effective immediately upon being signed by the 
Judge and entered by the clerk of the court. 
3. Defendant is awarded the temporary and permanent care, 
custody and control of the parties' minor children, subject to, 
plaintiff's reasonable and liberal rights of visitation. Plaintiff 
is awarded visitation with the children of the parties as agreed 
upon between the parties, and in the event that they are unable to 
agree, then visitation shall be according to the schedule of 
visitation set forth at Utah Code Ann., §30-3-35. Further, 
plaintiff's visitation with the parties1 children shall be 
conditioned as follows: 
a. plaintiff shall give notice to defendant twenty-four 
hours in advance if he intends actually to exercise the 
visitation with the children; and 
b. plaintiff shall exercise visitation with all of the 
minor children together, as a group, on at least one of his 
visitations per month. The remaining visitations may be with 
fewer than all of the remaining minor children, but this shall 
be conditioned such that if he takes fewer than all of the 
children for one visit, the next occasion when he takes fewer 
than all of the children he shall take some or all of the 
2 
children whu Lid not pa filieipat e nil Lhe last episode of 
visitation; and 
c. plaintiff may exercise visitation by coming to the 
home of the defendant and knocking on the door of the home to 
seek entry. He may come into the home to wait for the 
ch i ldren wh id e they are getting' ready for visitation, bi it: he 
may not wander about the premises., and shall remain in. the 
living room area; and 
d.• p 1, a i n t;1 f f wi 11 schedul e \ :i s :i t at io ri t hroug h fi; lie 
defendant directly and not with the minor children, unless 
defendant is not reasonably available to schedule the 
"v is i tat ion. 
3 . Plaintiff shall pay child support to defendant in the sum 
of $1,452.80 each month. 
I Plainti ff si ial 1 rnai ntaii I his cuireni 1,ife insurance <,ui his 
own li fe naming all of the children of the parties as the sole 
primary beneficiaries of that insurance until the youngest child of 
the parties has achieved the age of eighteen years or graduated 
from high school in due course. 
5. Plaintiff shall maintain health and accident insurance 
coverage as it is available to him through employment. Both 
parties are ordered to share equally in any medical, dental, 
orthodontic, optometric or psychotherapeutic expenses incurred for 
the benefit of the children not covered by plaintiff's policy of 
health insurance, and each shall hold the other harmless on one-
half of an] r si i ::h obi igations . 
6. Plaintiff shall be permitted to claim the children of the 
parties, Katie, Elizabeth and Gabriel, as dependents for purposes 
of calculating his. federal and state income taxation, so long as he 
is current in his total family support obligation to the defendant 
at the conclusion of any tax year in which the minor children are 
to be so claimed. In any event, defendant shall be permitted to 
claim the children of the parties, Robert, Benjamin and Nathan, as 
dependents for purposes of calculating her federal and state income 
taxation. 
7. No alimony is awarded in this action. 
8. The parties' previous division of their household 
furnishings and fixtures and personal clothing and effects, is 
confirmed in each, and each party is awarded those items currently 
in his or her possession, without financial set off from the other 
party. 
9. Plaintiff is awarded the 240 Volvo, free and clear of any 
claim of the defendant, subject to the indebtedness incurred 
thereon which plaintiff shall pay and assume and shall hold the 
defendant harmless thereon. Defendant is awarded the 740 Volvo, 
free and clear of any claim of the plaintiff, subject to the 
indebtedness thereon which the defendant shall pay and assume and 
shall hold the plaintiff harmless thereon. 
L0. Each party is awarded his or her own personal banking 
accounts, free and clear of any interest of the other party, 
without further contribution or set off from the other party. 
11. Each party is ordered to pay one-half of the $11,600.00 
4 
USAA indebtedness. 
12. Each party is ordered to pay and assume any debts or 
. .
 JL a e r o w n n a m e commencing effective 
with v::r date ,; ;.:r.i; ^h^ complaint for divorce in this 
action, and each shall hold the other harmless thereon. 
Each [Dart- wiJl pay $]S0,nn n\ M l fil00.no nosf; for the 
appraisal of the marital home. 
14. Defendant is awarded all of the parties1 interest in Duke 
F'arnifrj, Inc.; . 
15. Each party is awarded a one-half (1/2) interest in the 
home and real property located at 500 North 550 East, Heber City, 
Utah, wh.if,.:li piopert / is more particulai: J,) < JV aci ibcd a;* t'ol 1 ows: 
BEG 648.42 FT W & 8.25 RD S OF SE COR NWl/4 SEC 32, T3S, 
R5E, SLM; E 145 FT; N 105 FT; W 145 FT; S 105 FT TO BEG. 
AREA 0.35 ACRE 
Defendant is awarded possession of said home and real property, and 
is ordered to pay all debt thereon, until the fir st occurrence of 
any of the following events: 
a. when s a i d home i s so ] d; 
b. when the parties1 youngest e m Id reaches the age of 
eighteen (18) or graduates from-high school, which ever occurs 
later; 
c. when defendant remarries, co-habitats with a person 
of the opposite sex, or dies; 
d. when defendant shal] cease t:.i i use sad d home HIS her 
primary residence for a continuous period of more than three 
(3) months; or, 
5 
e. at any other time prior to any of the foregoing 
events in defendant's sole discretion. 
Upon the first occurrence of any of the foregoing events, the 
home will be immediately sold and the net equity evenly divided by 
the parties at that time with each party receiving half. Provided, 
however, if defendant wishes to prevent Plaintiff from benefiting 
from Defendant's pay-down of the mortgage, Defendant can choose to 
buy out Plaintiff's interest in the home; however, the Defendant 
will have one year from the date of the signing of the Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce in which to decide whether or not she wants to 
buy out Plaintiff, and make a substantial effort to do so. In 
either case, the value of Plaintiff's interest in the home will be 
determined by taking one-half the equity in the home at the time 
Plaintiff is paid out, and not the equity that existed on the date 
of trial. 
16. Each party is prohibited from placing or causing to be 
placed any lien, mortgage or any other encumbrance against the home 
and property described in paragraph 15 above. 
17. Defendant is awarded her retirement plan with a cash 
value of $9,133.00 free and clear of any claim of plaintiff. 
18. Plaintiff is awarded his retirement plan through the 
State of Utah with Traveler's Insurance subject to Defendant's 
$21,016.01 interest therein. Defendant shall be required at her 
sole expense to have prepared, filed with and executed by the Court 
any necessary qualified domestic relations order required by plan 
administrators to receive or separate her $21,016.01 interest. 
6 
19. Defendant is awarded $1,650.00 for attorney's fees and 
costs incurred herein. 
20. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver all 
necessary documents to transfer the title and ownership or perfect 
the liens of the property of the parties pursuant to this decree. 
DATED this day of ^rUPfs<* y 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
^^C^t^C, 
IOWARD <MAgIANI 
Districtcourt Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Supplemental Decree of Divorce was mailed, postage prepaid, to Mary 
C. Corporon, CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P^C., 808 East South Temple, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102, on this [4*- day of May, 1997. 
7 
ADDENDUM D 
MARY C. CORPORON #734 
Attorney for Respondent 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, PC. 
808 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
(801)328-1162 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELVON DAVID TURNER, ORDER ON OBJECTION TO SUPPLEMENTAL 
DECREE OF DIVORCE, MOTION TO CORRECT 
CLERICAL ERROR, AND RULE 52 AND Rule 
55 MOTIONS 
Petitioner, 
-vs- Case No. 954400098DA 
Dl ANN CAROL TURNER, 
Judge Howard Maetani 
Respondent. 
THE RESPONDENTS OBJECTION to supplemental decree of divorce, her motion 
to correct clerical error, and her motions pursuant to Rule 52 and 59 having come before 
the court for hearing, pursuant to a telephone conference, each party appearing by and 
through his or her respective counsel of record, and the court having ruled upon the 
pending motions, based thereon and for good cause appearing; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
The respondent's motions to correct the supplemental decree of divorce and 
objection to the supplemental decree of divorce, and her motions pursuant to Rule 52 and 
59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are granted. Specifically, paragraphs 17 and 18 
of the supplemental decree of divorce shall be amended as follows: 
17. Each party is ordered to share equally in defendant's retirement plan 
through her employment pursuant to the Woodward formula, one-half to each. 
Defendant is ordered to prepare a qualified domestic relations order distributing this 
retirement plan to the defendant, and to bear the expenses of that qualified 
domestic relations order. The date at which separation of the plans should be 
effective is the date of trial, November 21,1996. 
18. All plaintiffs retirement plans through the State of Utah, or his other 
employment, including the retirement plan with Traveler's Insurance, shall be 
divided equally between the parties, according to the Woodward formula, one-half 
to each. Defendant shall prepare at her sole expense, a qualified domestic 
relations order as necessary to accomplish this distribution of this retirement plan 
or plans. The date at which separation of the plans should be effective is the date 
of trial, November 21,1996. 
With the exception of this correction, respondent's motions are denied. The supplemental 
decree of divorce is deemed to be modified, amended and corrected to include the 
foregoing paragraphs 17 and 18, effective with the date of this order. With this exception, 
the supplemental decree of divorce previously entered herein shall remain in full force and 
effect. 
DATED THIS X\k day of ^ w C 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOWARD MAETANI 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE QF MAILING 
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I caused the foregoing to be mailed to: 
TERRY L CHRISTIANSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
P.O. Box 680284 
Park City, Utah 84068 
on the IX day of. QjlCJuf'. 1997. 
Secretary rtarv / 
ADDENDUM E 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MELVON DAVID TURNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DI ANN CAROL TURNER, 
Defendant. 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
C i v i l No. 954400098 DA 
| 1. Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this | mother and father for whom support is to be awarded. 
1 2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly 
1 income. Refer to Instructions for definition of income. 
| 2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually 
1 paid. (Do not enter alimony ordered for this case.) 
1 2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not | enter obligations ordered for the children in Line 1). 
| 2d. OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the | Children in Present Home Worksheet for either parent. 
1 3. Subtract Lines 2b, 2c and 2d from 2a. This is the 
1 Adjusted Gross Income for child support purposes. 
I 4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of 
1 children in Line 1 to the Support Table. Find the Base 
1 Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
1 5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line | 3 ty the COMBINED adjusted monthly gross in Line 3. 
6. Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain 
each parent's share of the Base Support Obligation. 
P. "" ,"•" '•" mmmme^amsmeBBBSa-aB^BBB!^aBBBBam—*mm-m-mm—-mmmi — — — — — — — — — — 
MOTHER 
$2,490.00 
-0-
-0-
-0-
$2,490.00 
•
 f 
36 % 
$ 817.20 
FATHER 
$4,461.00 
-0-
-o-
-0-
$4,461.00 
64 % 
$1,452.80 
COMBINED 
seven (7) 
$6,951.00 
$2,270.00 
* 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount in Line 6 for 
the Obligor Parent or enter the amount for the Low Income Table. 
$1,452.80 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Which parent is the obligor? ( ) Mother (x) Father 
Is the support award ordered the guideline amount in Line 7? 
(x) Yes ( ) No If NO, enter the amount ordered: $ 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation? 
{ ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
( ) other: 
Attorney Bar No. 0654 ( ) Electronic filing (x) Manual filing 
*2,134 (6 children) + 136 - (7th child) until graduates in May 1997 
BLENDED MONTHLY PAYMENTS 
7 
4 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
9 
9 
9 
25 
138.93^ 
142.79 
146.65 
1*50.51. 
154.37 
* 26 
137.27 
141.09 
144.9a 
148.71, 
152.52, 
AMORTISATION IN JIAItS 
29 
133.20 
136.89 
140.5* 
144.29 
147.99 146.76 
30 
132.08 
135.75 
139.42 
143.09 
35 
127.85 
131.40 
134.95 
138.51' 
142.06 
. 40 
125.16 
128.64 
132.11 
135.59 
45 
123.42 
126.85 
130.27 
133,70 
8% 
, 50 
122.27 
125.67 
129.07 
4/32.46 
139.07 137.13 135.86 
| lppa ,c 162.09 160.15 155.39, 154.10^149.16^ 146.02 1,43.99 142.65 
t,t 169.80 167.7ft 162. 79it 161.43*156.2^ 152.97^150.84 149.45 
v 1//.52, */^40 170.1* 168.77: 163.37 159.93 , 
u ,^185.2< 183.0X 177.59'176.111,170.47 166.88 
**c ??.2*9^ H ? - < . W L R3.4S ,177.57 173.83 
177.52, #5 .40 170.1% 168.7?; 163.37 159.93 ' 157.70 156.24 
' " — - 164.56 16i.03 
171.41 169.82 
178.27 176.62 
185.12 "183.41 
191.98 190.20 
198.84 Jj^.99 
i05.69 $ & 7 9 
200.68 
208.4Q 
198.28 
205.91 
192.351 190.78^ 184.67 180.79 
199.79^198.12 191.78 187.74, 
w._ . - _ * 198.88 '194.69 
205.9a 201.65 
213.0^208.60^ 
)ZZ 239.27 236.41 229 .39 C N 2£7 .47 220.19 215.55 212.55 -210.58 
fctf 246.99^,244.04; 236.79C, 234.81^ 2*7.29 222.50^ 219.41 %ti*}7 
h*l 2 ? * » 7 0 ^ ^ * ^ 244.19^ 2 4 ^ 1 5 ^ 2 ^ 3 9 229.46^226.26 ^ » , 1 7 
9$ 2 f i .4r 25^.29^ 251.59^i49 f 4^241 f 4^ 2^6.41 rr 233.12 230.96 
246,83 
253.69 
,2f? f79r 2 B i ; i ^ ; 2 7 K ^ 569.9(>:/#4.2f;; 560.54 
„ n o i ^ O T ^ l t t ^ W.17T; 277.017 tfUlT* 167.40 
i^^Mtt a% aafcSBftSK <2$# 
,244.54 
£5<W34 
^ « 1 3 
/£64*42 
k2?1.71 
<*78.51 
285.30 
292.09 
,298.89 
£ $ • 6 8 
_ ^ f 355.04. 350.ec> 340.38^3^54, 326.71, 319.85 315.39 312.47 
0$<? 3^2.7f v358.43^347«7C34^87l33X8Jr 326.80 3*2.25 319,26 
foL^NMtL 366.0*' 355.1^1352.21^340.93^333.75, 329.11 326.06 
O^f trW^i 37^684:362*58:^359.55^ 348.01 > 346.71
 u 335.96 332.85 
M6m^^h^^h94^h^^A m*U*h*2 ^9*<* 
2.43..377.10 
Kl9; 111.38 
373.61 
iD7;S7 
^•^rfjlKS?* 480^ 9^ IWAh l^il^J^ls^'l^lu ?4U53 
617.4&, 610.0fc,r59L.96t, 597.02^568.21 556.25., 548.51 
-™5**-0 5R48»2 IJ*&9%L*t&7&uU#rlh 591.02, $82.79 
B2^4.64],6*6.34: S $ . 9 C ^ . 3 § ; U 3 9 . 2 4 r 6 2 5 . 7 9 617,07 ,611.35 
4;y3^23^J24?475'702.95L^97;08i1:S74.75(>c660.55, 651.35 c645.32 
4 s $ * 8 W ? & ^ ? ? & 9 ^ ^ *3n# 
i577.39 
,611.35 
MUo 
